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Introduction
As an extension of public key encryption, Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [24, 15, 3] has been an active area of research recently, since it supports fine-grained access control of the encrypted data. ABE allows users to encrypt and decrypt messages based on user attributes. It is useful in providing anonymous access control, which is a desirable property in many applications, such as encrypted storage in distributed environments. In ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE), a user's private key is generated by the central authority according to his/her attributes. When someone encrypts a message, it selects a policy indicating what attributes the decryptor should hold. Unfortunately, this fascinating functionality comes at a cost. In a typical implementation, the size of a ciphertext is usually proportional to the number of attributes associated with it and the decryption time is proportional to the number of attributes used during decryption.
The first CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts under AND-gate access structure was proposed in [7] . Subsequently, Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols [16] 1 presented the first threshold ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts, which supports a more expressive access structure compared to [7] . Their construction works for the (t, s) threshold case, in which a user who is authorized to decrypt should hold at least t attributes among the s attributes selected by the encryptor. Due to the ability of the encryptor to select any threshold value t and attribute set during the encryption phase, their scheme is practical. Their scheme is inspired by the technique introduced by Delerablée and Pointcheval [9] in achieiving dynamic threshold identity-based encryption. Herranz et al.'s scheme is proven secure in the standard model based on the hardness of the augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) problem [16] .
Motivation
The technique used by Delerablée and Pointcheval [9] is to incorporate some "dummy information" (or, dummy users in their identity-based encryption scheme [9] ) as part of the computation in order to satisfy the decryption requirement. This technique was then used to construct threshold ABE in [16] . However, the incorporation of dummy attributes in [16] brings efficiency loss in both encryption and decryption, linear in the size of selected attribute set and dummy attribute set. To illustrate the efficiency lost, consider the following parameters used in [16] . Let s be the number of attributes in the chosen attribute set S, t be the threshold and m be the upper bound of the number of attributes in S. The costs for encryption and decryption in [16] are mainly dominated by m + t + 1 exponentiations and O(t 2 + m) exponentiations, respectively. It means, with the choice of small parameters in s and t, we will still require a large computation effort, since m is typically large.
One of the possible application scenarios is the case which usually appears in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG). As shown in [25] , the recent global epic combat strategy mobile game Clash-of-Clans 2 is an example of such games which will require an access control mechanism as described in this paper. In this game, each player has multiple attributes which will elevate after gaining more experience in the gameplay. The attributes are the possible features in the game, such as {"dragon", "canon", "bomb", · · · }. There is a large set of possible features that a player can acquire during the game, as the set of the possible features is very large. If a player acquires a new feature in the game, it means that this feature has been authorized by the central server, otherwise people can just simply cheat by creating the new feature themselves. Occasionally, the central server would like to broadcast a special feature (such as an advanced weapon in this game), which will only be available to people who have gained a particular level, which is measured by the number of features that this player has acquired. This "offer" will be broadcast to all players, but only players that satisfy the requirement can read this broadcast message. Therefore, this message needs to be sent in an encrypted form. Only players who have satisfied some certain level can decrypt this broadcast message. This certain level is determined by a minimum number of attributes that this player has, and hence, the notion of threshold requirement of attributes, t. Referring to the notation that was introduced earlier, the number of possible attributes, S, is typically very large, but a player only has a subset of this set, which is referred to as s. As an example, the set S = {"dragon", "snake", "canon", "bomb", "air trap", · · · }, where typically the total maximum available in S (which is m in the above notation) are around 10,000 features in a single game. A user who has played for a reasonable amount of time will gain approximately 100 features, and hence s = 100. If the threshold t is set to something like 30, then a user who holds at least 30 out of the possible features will be able to decrypt the broadcast ciphertext. Nevertheless, if the scheme in [16] is used, then each eligible user will still have to conduct a large computation, since m is large. This will make the scheme impractical, especially in the case where the application will be run in a mobile device. We note that in other scenarios, it would be typical to have a large m as well, even the value of s is small. Although Herranz et al.'s scheme [16] is not very computationally efficient, their construction enjoys a nice feature. Namely, any addition or removal of the attributes will not require any change to users' private keys or public parameters. We note that there are some subsequent works that achieve threshold ABE but do not have this feature. These works will be reviewed in the related work.
Summary of Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper are twofold: Another fascinating feature of our scheme is that it supports an efficient threshold change during the encryption process. The impact of using dummy attributes is that the threshold t must be known in the beginning of the encryption process, as this value determines how the ciphertext is being formed. While in our scheme, the value of t only affects one or two operations during the encryption, but not the overall computation, and therefore, the encryptor can change the threshold t without having to recompute the overall ciphertext.
Technical Contributions
In the following we describe an overview of our technique. Following [16] , let A be the set of attributes held by a user, and S be the set of attributes specified by the encryptor. Let A S = A ∩ S and F (γ) be the polynomial defined as
, which has degree m+t−1−|A S |. Here, |A S | denotes the number of attributes in A S and D m+t−1−s denotes a dummy attribute set with m+t−1−s dummy attributes.
Given the ciphertext, any user (whose A S = ∅) can compute
According to the setting, all redundant group elements e(g α , h) rκγ i must be removed in order to extract the encryption key e(g α , h) −κ from e(g α , h) rκF (γ) . Therefore, the user will successfully decrypt the ciphertext if and only if F (γ) is of degree m − 1 at most, which requires |A S | ≥ t. If dummy attributes are not embedded in F (γ), the degree of F (γ) will be always less than m − 1, such that the user can decrypt the ciphertext even its attribute number does not satisfy the threshold requirement. We notice that the required degree of F (γ) in the construction is mainly dominated by group elements e(g α , h) rκγ i , which can be computed by all users. Since all users can compute e(g α , h) rκγ i for all i up to m − 1, the security requires that e(g α , h) rκF (γ) with an (m − 1)-degree polynomial can only be generated by valid users.
In our scheme we take a different approach. We avoid to use dummy attributes by setting the way that all users can only compute e(g α , h) rκγ i for all i up to s − t − 1, instead of m − 1. Let A S ⊆ A ∩ S be the attribute set with t attributes at most and F (γ) be the polynomial defined as
Given the ciphertext, any private key user (A ∩ S = ∅) can compute
The user will successfully decrypt the ciphertext if and only if F (γ) has degree s − t. That is, |A S | = t. If |A S | < t, we have that the degree of F (γ) is larger than s − t such that all redundancy (that is e(g α , h) rκγ i ) cannot be removed for extracting the encryption key e(g β , h αγ s−t ) −κ from e(g α , h) rκF (γ) .
Structures of Private Key and Ciphertext
Private Key in [16] [16] and our scheme in terms of the structures of private key and ciphertext. In a private key, A is the set of attributes for a user and r is the chosen random number in private key generation. In the encryption, S is the set of attributes with s attributes where t is the corresponding threshold. κ is the random number chosen during encryption.
Related Work
The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first put forth by Sahai and Waters in [24] , which was originally referred to as fuzzy identitybased encryption. Goyal et al. [15] further defined two variants of ABE, namely Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. The decryption key, which is issued by an authority, is associated with an access structure. The ciphertext will be decrypted if and only if the attribute set of ciphertext satisfies the access structure of the decryption key. In contrast, in a CP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is equipped with an access structure, while the decryption key is associated with a set of attributes. The decryption is successful if and only if the attribute set fulfills the access structure. CP-ABE is more appropriate in access control applications, since it enables the encryptor to select the access structure to decide who is authorized to acquire the message. While the notion of CP-ABE has been proposed by Goyal et al. [15] , it was first studied in [7, 3] . The work of Cheung and Newport [7] only supports AND gates. The first concrete construction with expressiveness was presented by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [3] by using threshold secret sharing to enforce the policy in the encryption phase. Its security was analyzed in the generic group model. Goyal et al. [14] proposed a generic construction to transform a KP-ABE scheme into a CP-ABE scheme, with the drawback of large ciphertext size (roughly O(s 3.4 )) which makes it impractical for expressive policies. Subsequently, a number of papers have continued this line to achieve higher security schemes with expressive policy [18, 27, 21] .
The ciphertext size in most constructions of CP-ABE, for example, [8, 26, 22, 7, 3, 17] , is (at least) linear in the number of selected attributes. The first CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts under (n, n)-threshold access structure was proposed in [11] . While the KP-ABE scheme with constantsize ciphertexts was achieved by Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu in [2] which supports general access structures. Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols [16] initiated the study on achieving constant size ciphertext in threshold ABE, which is more expressive than merely AND gates (c.f. [7] ). They incorporated the technique from [9] to achieve the goal, where the original work [9] concentrates on achieving constant-size ciphertext in a dynamic threshold identity-based encryption setting. The security in [16] is provable secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the generic group model. Later, Yamada et al. [28] showed a generic construction for achieving chosenciphertext security (CCA) under the condition that the ABE scheme is of either delegatability or verifiability. Aiming to achieve CCA security in the standard model, Ge et al. [13] presented another threshold CP-ABE scheme with constant size ciphertexts by using the technique of [6] . Chen et al. [5] and Doshi and Jinwala [10] presented other constructions of threshold ABE with constant-size ciphertexts and full security.
In [13, 5] , the private key generation requires a fixed universal attribute set prior to the private key generation. This means, any addition or removal of the attributes will require changes to all of the user's private keys. In contrast, Herranz et al.'s scheme [16] does not have this drawback. It is because there is no requirement to map an attribute to a group element in this scheme (cf. [13, 5] ). The difference between these two approaches are usually referred to as "small universe" vs. "large universe". In a small universe constructions, at the setup time, a polynomial sized universe of attributes must be fixed. Additionally, the public parameters size is linear to the size of the attribute universe set. On the other hand, in a large universe constructions, the size of the attribute universe can be exponentially large. Furthermore, the size of the public parameters is linear to the upper bound of attribute number in the selected attribute set in the encryption phase. For further details about the differences between small universe and large universe, we refer the readers to [19, 28] . The notion of ABE was originally proposed for flexible access control. We refer the readers to such as [23, 20, 12] for some recent interesting work on access control.
Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the definition and security model of threshold attribute-based encryption given in [16] . We also introduce a variant computational hard problem which is related to the security proof of our scheme.
Threshold Attribute-Based Encryption
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting threshold decryption policy consists of the following four algorithms.
Setup(λ, P, m) The algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, a universal set of attributes P and the upper bound of attribute number in encryption. It returns public parameters params and a master secret key.
Key Extraction(params, A, msk) The algorithm takes as input public parameters, an attribute set A ⊆ P and the master secret key. It returns a private key sk A for this attribute set.
Encryption(params, S, t, M ) The algorithm takes as input public parameters, an attribute set S, a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| and a message M . It returns a ciphertext CT for (S, t).
Decryption(CT, (S, t), A, sk A ) The algorithm takes as input a ciphertext for (S, t), an attribute set A and the corresponding private key sk A . It returns a message if |A ∩ S| ≥ t, and ⊥ otherwise.
We notice that the size of P in the original definition [16] is equal to m. However, we find that the size of P can be larger than m. The independence is much practical in use and we therefore adopt the latter definition. We show that the difference will not affect the construction and the security proof in this work.
The security of threshold ABE we consider here is indistinguishability under selective security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA), which is defined by the following game between an attacker A and a challenger. The advantage of the attacker in the above game is defined as | Pr
A Threshold ABE is said to be IND-sCPA secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time attackers A its advantage in the game is negligible in λ.
The aMSE-DDH Problem
Our scheme is based on bilinear pairing. Its security relies on a hard problem slightly different from the problem defined in [16, 9] . Here, we still call this problem as augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (aMSE-DHE) since the main difference is in the given exponents. We prove that this aMSE-DDH problem is one of the generic Diffie-Hellman problems defined by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [4] .
Let BG = (G, G T , p, e) be a bilinear pairing group, where p is the prime order of both G and G T , and e is the bilinear map. Let g 0 , h 0 be two generators of G. The input of aMSE-DDH problem consists of q, s, t, f (x), g(x), T ∈ G T where f (x), g(x) are random co-prime polynomials in the following formulas
and group elements
All roots x i , x i are given but all exponents α 0 , β 0 , γ, ω are unknown. The aim of this problem is to decide whether the given group element T is
or T is a random element from G T .
Theorem 1. The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P, Q, F )-Generic Diffie-Hellman Exponent (GDHE) assumption.
Proof. Given q, s, t, f (x), g(x), T ∈ G T where f (x), g(x) are co-prime polynomials in the following formulas
h ω 0 , h ωγ 0 , h ωγ 2 0 , · · · , h ωγ m+t 0 , the aim of this problem is to decide whether
or T is a random element from G T . In the following theorem, we prove that this hard problem captures the independence as required in the (P, Q, F )-GDHE problem.
Theorem 2. The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P, Q, F )-GDHE assumption.
Proof. Let h 0 = g η 0 for some integer η. The aMSE-DDH problem can be reformulated as a (P, Q, F )-GDHE structure where
To prove aMSE-DDH problem is a (P, Q, F )-GDHE problem, we need to prove that no coefficients {a i,j } and b 1 exist such that
where p i , p j are from P and q 1 is from Q. By making all possible products of two polynomials from P that contains common parameter ηκα 0 β 0 , we prove that there is no linear combination from the set R below which can generate F .
If there exists such a combination, it can be written as
where A(γ) is a polynomial in γ of degree at most (q + t) and B(γ) is a polynomial of degree at most (m + t − 2). Let the degree of A(x) be d A in the above formula. We firstly simplify the formula as
Then, we have that
The degree of B(γ) is at most m + s − 2 so that the left polynomial cannot be equivalent to zero. Therefore, the above equation implies that the two non-zero polynomials must have the same degree. The degree of the left polynomial is q + m + t − 1 while the degree of the right polynomial is
Since f (γ) and g(γ)γ m+t−s are co-prime, we therefore have f 
Our New Threshold ABE Scheme
In this part we describe our threshold ABE scheme in details, which does not use any dummy attributes during encryption and decryption.
Description of Scheme
Setup(λ, P, m). The master entity chooses a suitable encoding τ 3 which maps each of the attributes at ∈ P to a different element τ (at) ∈ Z p . It also chooses a bilinear group BG = (G, G T , p, e) and generators g, h of G 1 . Next, the master entity picks at random α, β, γ ∈ Z p and sets
The master secret key is msk = (g, h, β, γ) and the public parameters for P are params = BG, m, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , · · · , g m , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h m , u, τ .
Key Extraction(params, A, msk). Given any subset A ⊆ P, the master entity picks r ∈ Z p at random and computes sk A as
Encryption(params, S, t, M ). Given a subset S ⊆ P with s = |S| attributes, a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s, and a message M ∈ G T , the sender picks at random κ ∈ Z p and computes
The group element C 2 could be computed from h αγ i given in the public parameters params. Let f S (x) = at∈S (x + τ (at)) be the polynomial in x and a i be the coefficient of
Decryption((C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), (S, t), A, sk A ). Any user with a set of attributes A satisfying |A ∩ S| ≥ t can decrypt the ciphertext by using the private key sk A . The decryption works as follows. Let A S be any subset of A ∩ S with |A S | = t, and f S\A S (x) = at∈S\A S (x + τ (at)) be the polynomial in x and b i be the coefficient of
The user first computes the aggregation value as (γ+τ (at)) , C 2
Finally, the user recovers the message by computing M = C 3 · K −1 L/L.
Correctness
The decryption is correct since we have L = e g r at∈A S
(γ+τ (at)) , C 2 = e g r at∈A S
(γ+τ (at)) , h κ·α· at∈S (γ+τ (at)) = e(g, h) rκα at∈(S−A S ) γ+τ (at) ,
Security Proof
Theorem 3. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA security of our ABE scheme with advantage for a universe P of q attributes, and a challenge pair (S, t) with s = |S|, there exists an algorithm for solving the (q, m, s, t)-aMSE-DDH problem with at least the same advantage .
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the IND-sCPA security of our ABE scheme. We construct an algorithm (simulator) B that uses A as a subroutine to solve the aMSD-DDH problem. In particular, the simulator B is given an instance of this hard problem and its aim is to solve this problem by using A's guess of the encrypted message. The interaction between A and B works as follows.
Initialize: The simulator B specifies a universe of attributes P = {at 1 , · · · , at q }. Next, the adversary selectively chooses (S, t) to attack, where S is a set with s attributes and t is a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s. Without loss of generality, let S = {at 1 , at 2 , · · · , at s } be the challenge set.
Setup: Let group elements in the instance that B receives be
g ω 0 , g ωγ 0 , g ωγ 2 0 , · · · , g ωγ q+t 0 ,
h ω 0 , h ωγ 0 , h ωγ 2 0 , · · · , h ωγ m+t 0 ,
where f (x), g(x) are co-prime polynomials with degrees q and s, respectively, defined as
The simulator B defines the encoding of each attribute into a unique root as below:
if at ∈ S. Then it sets g, h, α, β, γ using the group elements and unknown exponents in the instance as
Then we have
The degree of polynomial γ m−i f (γ) in γ is at most q + m. And we have that all g i can be computed from the line (1) of the instance, all h i are available from the line (4) of the instance, and u can be computed from the line (2) of the instance because f (γ)γ t−1 in u has degree q + t − 1 only. The algorithm B then simulates the rest of the game as below.
Their degrees are both at most m + t − 2. Then we have
, and ωγf at i (γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t degree at most; β 0 f at i (γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t − 1 degree at most; ωγf i 1 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m + t − 1 degree at most; β 0 f i 1 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m + t − 2 degree at most; ωγf m 1 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m + t − 1 degree at most; β 0 f 2 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m + t − 2 degree at most.
Finally, the simulator B computes g r γ+τ (at i ) for all at i from the lines (2) and (3) 
is from the last element of the line (1), h κα 0 α 0 g(γ)γ m 0 is from the last element of the line (2) and T is the unknown element to be decided.
Let κ in the instance be the random number for encryption. If T = e(g 0 , h 0 ) α 0 β 0 f (γ)γ m+s−1 , we have
Therefore, CT * is a valid challenge ciphertext for (S, t) on the message M b .
On the other hand, if T is random, C 3 is random and independent of the choice of the bit b.
Guess: The adversary returns a guess b of b, and the simulator returns true if b = b which means T = e(g 0 , h 0 ) α 0 β 0 f (γ)γ m+s−1 . Otherwise, the simulator returns a random T .
Discussion and Comparison

Benefits of Encryption without Dummy Attributes
Let f (γ) be the polynomial in γ whose degree is m − 1. We have the computation on h καf (γ) from κ, h αγ i : i ∈ [0, m − 1] requires m exponentiations. In particular, let f i be the coefficient of γ i in f (γ). We have h καf (γ) is computed by
If we want to compute h καf (γ)(γ+d) , we cannot save the overload computation with the additional input h καf (γ) as h καf (γ)(γ+d) must be computed by
which still requires a linear number of exponentiations in the degree of f (γ)(γ + d).
The main computation in encryption of [16] is dominated by
while in our scheme it is dominated by C 2 = h κ·α at∈S (γ+τ (at)) . Based on the above analysis, our encryption time is liner in the number of s while the scheme in [16] is linear in the number of m, where m is the upper bound of s. The corresponding decryption is also different and ours will be much faster. The detailed efficiency comparison is provided in Table 2 .
Efficient Threshold Change
Another benefit of our encryption is the dynamic choice of the threshold t after the selection of attribute set S. Notice that an encryption is to compute C 1 , C 2 and K, which costs one exponentiation, |S| exponentiations and one exponentiation, respectively. In our scheme, upon receiving the set S, the encryptor can compute C 2 without the need of the threshold t, which dominates most of exponentiations in encryption. Once the threshold t is given, only two exponentiations are required to compute C 1 and K. While in [16] , both S and t must be provided before the encryption, otherwise the encryptor cannot perform the computation of C 2 . This property allows
Schemes
Key Size
Ciphertext Size Encryption Cost Decryption Cost CN [7] (2n + 1)|G| (n + 1)|G| + |G T | (n + 2)e (n + 1)p DJ [10] (|A| + 2)|G| 2|G| + |G T | 3e 2p EMN+ [11] 2|G| 2|G| + |G T | 3e 2p + 3e BSW [3] (2|A| + 1)|G| ( + 1)|G| + |G T | (2 + 2)e |I|p W [27] (|A| + 2)|G| ( + 2)|G| + |G T | (2 + 2)e |I|p GZC+ [13] 2n(n + |A|)|G| 2|G| + |G T | 3e 2p + 2ne HLR [16] (m + |A|)|G| 2|G| + |G T | (m + t + 1)e 3p + O(t 2 + m)e Ours (m + |A|)|G| 2|G| + |G T | 1p + (s + 3)e 2p + O(t 2 + s)e Table 2 : Efficiency Comparison of related CP-ABE schemes. p and e are paring computation and exponentiation computation, respectively. n is the number of universal attributes. is the size of an access formula. s is the number of attributes in the chosen attribute set S. t is the corresponding threshold number and m is the upper bound of attribute number in S. |A| and |I| are the numbers of attributes in a user's key and the number of attributes satisfied the function, respectively. We notice that the pairing computation in the encryption can be saved if all e(h αγ i , u) have been precomputed in the public parameters.
the encryptor to flexibly change the threshold during the application before publishing the ciphertext. More precisely, suppose the encryptor has already created a ciphertext for (S, t) using the random number κ and the ciphertext is not yet published. If the threshold t needs to be revised with t for any t , the encryptor can use the old C 2 and re-compute C 1 , K for the updated threshold t , which allows the encryptor to quickly change (S, t) into (S, t ) with two exponentiations. There is no security issue in this variant encryption because only the ciphertext for (S, t ) is published and it is equivalent to a ciphertext generation from the encryption algorithm directly. The detailed performance comparison is provided in Table 3 .
Conclusion
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has proven to be a very promising cryptographic primitive that offers fine-grain access control. Herranz et al. proposed the first constant-size threshold ABE. However, their scheme makes use of dummy attributes, which leads to inefficiency. In this work, we improved Herranz et al.'s work and proposed a new threshold ABE scheme which does not require any dummy attributes. We made two specific improvements in comparison to the previous work. First, the cost for encryption and decryption is only linear to the size of the selected attribute set. Second, the threshold can be decided after the selection of the attribute set in the Schemes Universe Threshold Change Security Expressiveness CN [7] Small Ö Selective AND-gate DJ [10] Small Ö Full AND-gate EMN+ [11] Small Ö Selective (n,n)-Threshold BSW [3] Large Ö Selective Access Tree W [27] Small Ö Selective LSSS GZC+ [13] Small ≈ 1e Selective Threshold HLR [16] Large (m + t − 1)e Selective Threshold Ours Large 2e Selective Threshold Table 3 : Comparison of related CP-ABE schemes. The symbol "Ö" means that it does not support the corresponding functionality.
encryption phase. These two properties make our scheme more attractive in practical use.
